Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
1

I Introduction
We try to measure the impact work creation programs and rearmament had on employment and production of the German economy before World War II. Theoretically based on an extended version of the conventional input-output analysis, our model or analytical framework integrates the Keynesian multiplier into Leontief´s traditional open static quantity model. Empirically, we apply our recently presented input-output table of Germany for the benchmark year of 1936. 4 This earliest German input-output table covers 40 economic branches/sectors, five categories of final demand and five primary inputs (see Appendix Table  A1 ).
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In this foremost analytical paper, we cannot but cover the vast historiographic literature on the subject only selectively.
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II The model
An input-output table comprehensively and quantitatively discloses interdependencies between different branches of a national economy and thus reveals the structure of an economy. This is a powerful tool to measure and thus to analyse direct and indirect effects between production and final output or employment. At the same time, it is possible to assess the impact of final demand on employment and production. The traditional Leontief-model, however, does not cover the effects induced through increased income and thus additional consumption. Keynes´ theory of the multiplier deals with this phenomenon:
If final demand expands through an exogenous stimulus (e. g. additional government spending on a work creation program), cycles of spending are brought about that increase employment, production and an income that is generated in the production process. This induced income will lead to additional consumption depending on the marginal propensity to consume and the consumption pattern of private households and further to another round of spending. This circuit incorporating changes in final demand, production, income and employment is reflected in the Keynesian income multiplier. The Keynesian consumption (demand) function and thus the multiplier can be integrated into Leontief´s static quantity model: 
III Input-output table
The matrix of input coefficients (A) of 40 branches is directly derived from the first quadrant of the input-output (I-O) table by dividing input values by gross production values (row 1-45).
The matrix of primary input coefficients for gross production (A g ) is calculated in a similar way by dividing the values in the rows 41 to 45 by gross production values.
For applying the input-output analysis to military spending, the basic data of the input-output table had to be rearranged: to isolate the effects of rearmament, the government sector was split up into civilian (non-military) and military spending. The civilian part of government activity remained in quadrant I of the input-output table whereas military expenditure became a separate vector in quadrant II, i. e. part of final demand. By this operation, both government components were artificially separated into an exogenous (military) and an endogenous (civilian) category within the input-output table. Employment in the government sector was split up as well to get an appropriate labour coefficient or labour output ratio (l). Table 8 presents our basic data on government expenditure in total and on military, in particular.
IV Final demand
Work creation programs
From the first, work creation programs have been closely associated with Hitler´s government. He became German chancellor on 30. 1. 1933. This year witnessed high unemployment and investment at an extremely low level which not even covered the amount necessary to compensate for wear and tear (depreciation). 8 One should keep in mind, however, that measures against the till then unknown economic slump had been initiated before that year and that the turning point of the business cycle had been surpassed 1933 as well.
9 But the work creation programs proper did not get momentum before Hitler´s government came into power. 10 We thus concentrate on the three years from 1933 to 1935, when most of the money or funds were spent for this purpose.
11 Based on Grebler (1937) (Stäglin/Fremdling 2015) . Between 1928 and 1932, the IfK was in charge of the Industrial Reporting System (Industrieberichterstattung) and thus gathered information on employment and work capacity from selected industrial firms (Gierth 1941 Ritschl (2003, pp. 134 ff.) drew the same conclusion. Abelshauser (1999, p. 505) , however, doubts this proposition.
10 See details about the timing and the amount of these measures in Grebler 1937, pp. 418-421; Schiller 1936, pp. 54 ff.; for a description and discussion of the programs, see as well Kroll 1958 , especially chapters 10 to 13.
11 For the sake of simplicity we do not distinguish between direct (unmittelbare) and indirect (mittelbare Arbeitsbeschaffung) work creation programs. We assume that indirect measures such as tax vouchers (Steuergutscheine) created funds of the same size for spending. Other indirect measures like increased allowance for depreciation of newly purchased equipment, however, are not included in the figures of the I-O analysis. Holtfrerich emphasized the impact of this measure (100 % immediate depreciation of investment) in his criticism of a book by Harold James (Holtfrerich 1992, p. 500) . Schröder discussed the rules of depreciation in the 1934 tax reform in detail: 100 % immediate depreciation for investment goods with a lifetime of less than five years (Abschreibungsfreiheit für kurzlebige Wirtschaftsgüter) and for replacement investment (Sofortabschreibung von Ersatzbeschaffung), even in retrospect for these expenses before 1934, see Schröder 1996, pp. 73-80, 132 ff. 4 Buchheim (2008, Tabelle 3, p. 391) conveniently summarized the 12 programs specifying the amount and the year of spending of these funds. Not all of these measures truly qualified as additional spending for a specific work creation program. 12 Our reassessment of the policy therefore inevitably contains some speculative elements. Several of the twelve work creation programs bore labels in rather general or meaningless terms (e. g. Sofortprogramm, sonstige Massnahmen) or (Papen, Reinhardt), which do not allow to assign them properly to economic activities or areas of spending. 13 We drew on Schiller´s detailed tables for 1933 and 1934 on the amounts granted for specific purposes. In a first step, we allocated total spending derived from Buchheim´s table for the programs 12) according to the percentage distribution calculated from Schiller´s figures (see Table 1 ). The amounts spent on Germany´s railways (Reichsbahn no. 9), post office (Reichspost no. 10) and the famous motorways (Reichsautobahnen no. 11) were directly inserted into Table 1. In a second step, we decided on which branches of the economy the money was spent in the first round. We selected those specific branches from our I-O table which presumably would have met the demand. Technically, we constructed a vector of final demand which complies with the delimitation of the I-O table. The numbers of the rows of Table 2 refer to the corresponding rows of the I-O table. The numbers of the columns either refer to a column of our investment matrix (see appendix Table A2) 15 or a column of the I-O table: they indicate that a specific amount of a work creation program had to be assigned to several branches. 16 In order to split this amount up the figures of the investment matrix or I-O table were used to generate a percentage distribution for the allocation. Accordingly, we assigned the funds (grants) of the work creation programs to specific branches of the I-O Table  8 for the values). We extended our analysis of German rearmament beyond the benchmark year of 1936 by applying the same methodology to the entire decade of the 1930s, the crucial period before the Second World War: we drew on figures of military expenditure compiled by Oshima for the fiscal years 1932 to 1939. 17 In order to assign this spending to the sectors of our input-output table we used the same percentage distribution as for the calendar year of 1936. In this way we got eight vectors of final demand (y) concerning rearmament (see Table  10 ).
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V Impact of work creation programs
We proceeded in the following way: based on the input coefficients of our input-output Table 3 for the aggregate and Table 4 for sectoral 20 results). The direct effects are the values, i. e. initial spending, of the final demand vectors (Table 2) . Multiplying this initial spending by the labour output ratio (l = labour coefficients) of each sector (number of workers per output of one million RM) 21 yielded the direct employment effects. Similarly, the impact both on direct and indirect (Leontief) employment was obtained by multiplying the labour coefficients by the vectors of direct and indirect production effects combined (see Tables 3 and 4 ). This matrix algebra solely provided the indirect effects based on the Leontief model. For the Keynesian extension of our model, a vector of the consumption pattern was needed: based on our consumption matrix 22 we compiled the figures shown in Table 4 , column 2 (w1). We lightly adjusted the structure of consumption by dropping items related to higher income households. 23 In addition to the structure of consumption, we had to assume as to what extent the additional income was spent on consumption. Besides the marginal propensity to consume balancing effects had to be taken into account. For this purpose, an almost forgotten calculation by the German Statistical Office in 1933 was very helpful. 24 The StRA distinguished between two different types of work creation programs: firstly arbeitsintensive programs demanding a high input of labour and secondly materialintensive programs demanding a high input of material. With this distinction in mind the StRA put forward a Keynesian type of reasoning about the secondary effects of government spending on work creation (as soon as in 1933). Displayed numerically and graphically, the StRA presented 12 rounds of circular spending via the income multiplier. It took into account that those people getting work through this measure did not claim unemployment money or any other pecuniary help from the government any more. Furthermore, the StRA reckoned that the government could profit from additional taxes and contributions to social security schemes. In analogy to the StRA, we allowed for these balancing effects and assumed rather low spending shares (w2) in two variants: ratios of 0.5 or 0.45 for dependent households and for entrepreneurs 0.5 and 0.3. 25 Thus we got two different Keynesian private consumption multipliers depending on our assumed spending shares: D 1 (0.5 and 0.5) and D 2 (0.45 and 0.3). Table 3 shows our aggregate results of analysing the impact of work creation on the German economy between 1933 and 1935. Table 4 complements the results by a sectoral breakdown for 1934 both for production and employment. Due to our assumptions, the same structural relations hold true for the other two years in question, 1933 and 1935. 20 We put forward the sectoral distribution only for one year, i. e. 1934. This is justified because we stuck to the same structural relations (i. e. fixed coefficients and labour output ratios) for all years. 21 See the first column in Table 4 . 22 See Table 4 -16 in Fremdling/Staeglin 2014 a, p. 248. 23 We still covered more than 70 percent of private consumption at purchasers´ prices in 1936. For our subsequent calculation, we used as well a consumption vector at producers´ prices. A sensitivity analysis revealed, however, that the difference in prices did not matter, thus we do not depict these results.
24 Statistisches Reichsamt 1933 . 25 Technically we assigned 0.5 and 0.45 to "Compensation of employees" and 0.5 and 0.3 to "Mixed income/operating surplus" in the matrix of primary inputs, whereas the other primary inputs were set at zero. 
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The work creation programs generated nearly three hundred thousand work places in 1933 directly and half a million in 1934 before the number dropped significantly to 162 thousand in 1935. In addition, our method revealed a substantial indirect increase of work creation by nearly fifty percent through Leontief-type linkage effects and even more via the Keynesian multiplier: a higher propensity to consume (D1) resulted in a multiplier of 1.6, a lower one (D2) still generated a multiplier of 1.0. Indirectly induced employment altogether increased the amount of workplaces by a factor of two (D1) or 1.5 (D2) (see Table 4 ). If both direct and indirect effects as revealed by our model are taken together (see Table 3 ) the work creation programs proper created up to one and a half million jobs in 1934 (D1) and at least 400 thousand ones in 1935 (D2). Concerning production (see the last row of Table 4 ) the Leontief linkage effects are higher and the Keynesian multiplier effects are lower than the indirect effects on employment. These differences are due to a different labour productivity of those industries/sectors which profited from the work creation programs.
It is thus helpful that our method also allows to detect those branches which profited most from indirect effects. Besides domestic services all other branches were involved by Leontief linkages. Concerning both production and employment, these indirect effects were most powerful in quite a number of branches closely linked to the production of producer goods namely mining; basic iron and steel; fabricated iron and steel products; stone and quarrying; saw mills and timber processing; food, beverages and tobacco; wholesale trade and transport and communication. Due to the pattern of our consumption function, the Keynesian multiplier effects were widespread on the one hand but mainly concentrated on those branches closely related to the demands of private households namely agriculture; manufactured wood products; printing and duplicating; leather industry; textiles; clothing; food, beverages and tobacco and retail trade.
VI Evaluation of work creation programs
At first sight, our results seem to corroborate findings which put forward the rather modest impact of these work creation programs e. g. by Buchheim (2008) and Ritschl (2003) .
26 Ritschl (2003) concluded "that public deficits were too small to account for the speed of recovery between 1933 and 1936". By applying an autoregressive model he predicted in retrospect: "An upswing under selffulfilling expectations would have had exactly the same vigor without Hitler and without deficit spending." Buchheim (2008, p. 392 ) supported his own view by quantifying the direct effects of the work creation programs. He referred to Grebler (1937, p. 822 ) and even overestimated the direct impact: based on the assumption of 2000 RM per workplace and year Buchheim divided the entire amount of roughly 1.5 billion RM spent on work creation in 1933 by this yearly rate for employing one worker. In this way he estimated that in 1933 between 700,000 and 800,000 additional work places for one year were, or could have been, created. The reasoning is flawed, however: although Grebler arrived at about the same figure, he made clear that this figure of 2000 RM only applied to those works for which the public administration entirely financed the work program and he should have added, for which no significant additional costs were involved in getting people to work. This latter assumption probably held true for the publicly sponsored relief or emergency works (Notstandsarbeiten) but not for regular employment in established firms. The funds of the work creation program were not solely spent on wages but on purchases from other firms at their selling price, i. e. the turnover or gross production value: it comprised value added (wages and profits) and costs of inputs from other firms.
In Table 5 we calculated figures of gross production, gross value added and gross wage per person employed for those branches for which we imputed the spending on work creation. Dividing gross production value per worker through Grebler´s 2000 RM indicates how many times this amount would have had to be spent in order to create one workplace in a particular industry directly (workplace ratio): neglecting trade charges and transportation costs, more than three times for the average of the entire economy (without agriculture) and about the same for the branches 9, 10, 11 and 12. In all the other branches the ratio is lower and in agriculture the 2000 RM even would have sufficed to induce more than one work place. This outcome highly correlates with labour productivity (GVA per worker) and average wage per branch. Other than Buchheim/Grebler, we had these caveats in mind when we applied the labour output ratio (labour coefficient) to these work creation programs. Of course we got significantly lower figures for direct employment than Buchheim/Grebler had estimated (290 thousand in 1933, see Table 3 ; for the labour output ratio see Table 4 ).
On the other hand, work creation programs under the label of Notstandsarbeiten (relief works) or the Arbeitsdienst (semi-enforced labour) provided work for quite a lot of people explicitely not yet included in our analysis (see Table 6 ): After the First World War, the wertschaffende Arbeitslosenfürsorge (emergency work) was introduced. 27 From 1927 27 Petzina et al. 1978, p. 122; Schiller 1936, pp. 35 onwards, it was financed by the work exchange, and thus became a substitute for the payment of unemployment money (Syrup 1936, p. 134) . In addition, a voluntary labour service was introduced in 1931 for unemployed young people. 28 People engaged in this kind of work lived in camps and were mainly employed for cultivating soil (Landeskulturarbeiten) and increasingly for harvesting (Einsatz bei landwirtschaftlichen Erntenotständen).
29 Grebler´s 2000 RM surely would have sufficed to cover board and lodging, some cash payment (pocket money) and even simple tools. Probably this figure is still too high if one follows the reasoning of the German Statistical Office which calculated 1200 RM per workplace for these programs in 1933. 30 This type of work, however, presumably had barely any additional backward linkage effects on other branches of the economy.
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It is not clear as to what extent these measures of creating cheap work are comprised in our I-O analysis.
32 Some money for this kind of work is included in Table 1 under the heading of Grundförderung (einschließlich Arbeitsdienst). The amount spent is too low for financing all the labour approximately engaged in the programs 1 to 3 listed in Table 6 . The bulk of these people was either financed by the other programs (Table 1) or by additional funds not yet dealt with. According to Grebler (1937, pp. 421 f.) Arbeitsdienst and Landhilfe, Landjahr were not included in the work creation programs proper. The Institute for Business Cycle Research (IfK) distinguished between regular and additional employment (zusätzliche Beschäftigung). The figures for additional employment match rather well with the comparable numbers derived from other sources (see rows 4 and 4a of Table 6 ). 28 The "Reichsarbeitsdienst", a compulsory or semi-enforced labour service of young women and men, continued this program from 1934/35 onwards. In 1936/37, this workforce was planned to comprise 230,000 men. The labour service of women remained small, about 10,000 at any time around 1936, whereas more than 200,000 men were concerned before 1936 (Patel 2005 In order to avoid double counting of cheap relief work in our I-O analysis, we dropped the funds spent for "Grundförderung" 33 from our calculation (see Table 6 , rows 6a, b and Table  3 ). As shown in Table 3 , these funds had a rather modest impact on direct and indirect work creation. In rows 7 a, b of Table 6 , we calculated an approximation of the total labour force engaged directly and indirectly in some kind of work creation program. With all the caveats in mind, it seems pretty clear that these aggregates for the years 1933 to 1935 are an upperbound estimates because probably the figures still contain some double counting. Thus far there is no clear-cut evidence to avoid this bias. Compared with the registered unemployed , those, who got work through the programs referred to, made up nearly twenty percent in 1933, more than fifty percent in 1934 and more than one fifth in 1935 (row 5a of Table 6 ).
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The decrease of registered unemployed dependent workers (row 8 of Table 6 ) is in line with the numbers created by any kind of work creation (rows 7a, b of Table 6 ).
Although our findings are biased upwards it seems difficult to maintain the proposition that the work creation programs had a rather modest impact on employment. All the less as we did not yet account for the impact of rearmament on employment. Thus to some extent our findings support the views put forward by Abelshauser 35 Our I-O analysis catches pretty well the direct and indirect impact of the work creation programs through the interrelated production process covered in the first quadrant of the I-O table (Leontief effects). It furthermore reflects the secondary effects generated through additional income and thus increased private consumption (Keynes multiplier). In this interim evaluation, we can as well compare our results with similar attempts to calculate or rather assume the size of a Keynesian-type multiplier.
Here the study conducted by the German Statistical Office (Statistisches Reichsamt) as early as in 1933 is helpful: by way of example and based on sound empirics, it calculated the secondary effects of work creation including e. g. additional income, increased state revenues, decreased unemployment compensation and increased savings. 39 The StRA applied the same reasoning which later became known as the Keynesian multiplier. Without putting forward the sophisticated assumptions and the four alternative calculations in detail here the StRA arrived at multipliers within the range of 2.3 to 3.7 for government spending and 1.3 to 3.6 for job creation.
As a high ranked civil servant in the Ministry of Economics, the "German Keynes" Wilhelm Lautenbach had proposed work creation programs to fight the economic crisis as early as in 1931. 40 Stützel, who edited Lautenbach´s work posthumously, carefully juxtaposed two versions of a proposal for deficit spending put forward in 1931. 41 In the same bundle an article of 1936 42 is reprinted in which Lautenbach discussed the multiplier of public investment. Through a saving ratio of one quarter the income effects "petered out" and thus Lautenbach got the rather high multiplier of four.
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In their textbook, published in 2013, Spoerer/Streb 44 discuss this issue referring to Erbe 45 : He put forward a multiplier of 1.6 or 1.5 by comparing the increase of national income 36 "In contrast to the United States and Britain, fiscal policies undertaken by the Nazis helped to promote a quick and complete economic recovery from the Great Depression in Germany." Conclusion by Cohn 1992, p. 318. 37 , however, did not stick to the work creation program proper, but evaluated the entire package of government policy ("particularly in construction, motorisation and rearmament") which stimulated the economy. On the importance of the "motor-car revolution" in particular, see Overy (1975) . 38 See also Spoerer (2005) 
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(Volkseinkommen) yielded by additional government spending between 1932 and 1936. His crude guestimate and references to similar rather speculative reasonings of other scholars led him to conclude, that the secondary effects of public investment had been very modest ("sehr gering"). Spoerer/Streb accept Erbe´s reasoning, not the least because they assumed an exaggerated (textbook) Keynesian multiplier of five for government spending as yardstick when discussing the effects of NS-economic policy. It seems pretty clear, however, that empirically founded calculations of multipliers yielded significantly lower figures than textbook multipliers. 46 In line with this reasoning, our multipliers (see last row of Table 4 ) comply with contemporary compilations by the StRA. We thus conclude that rather low multipliers (compared with textbook calculations) are no convincing argument against the impact of any governmental programs to stimulate work creation by deficit spending.
VII A note on deficit spending
We do not want to reopen the discussion as to what extent the NS-economic policy can be labelled as Keynesian in its nature. Ritschl (2003) neatly summarized this discussion and referred to the relevant literature. 47 According to his findings, the NS-measures came too late and were too small to allow a Keynesian interpretation of the recovery process. He thus corroborates Erbe´s findings, but rejects among others Overy´s and Cohn´s conclusions.
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One concern was, however, as to what degree work creation and rearmament had been financed by deficit spending. We can complement this aspect by referring to an archival source on this issue which we recently detected: in 1938 the Department VI Statistik der Umsatzverflechtung 49 of the StRA (currently it would have been labelled: Department of National Accounting and Input-Output Analysis) provided a preliminary (Entwurf) report for the Minister of Economics on Statistische Grundlagen für die Finanzierung der Volkswirtschaft (basic statistics on financing the economy). 50 According to these figures (see Table 7 ) the government (public administration) increased its yearly borrowing, on balance by between one to more than four billion RM between 1933 and 1936. 51 During the same period (until 1935) the private part of the German economy reduced its debt considerably, on balance by two and a half billion RM. 46 See Thomas (1983) with moderate, but empirically founded, multipliers of government spending for Britain during the 1930s. 47 On this, see among others in particular the classical study by Erbe (1958) . 48 Ritschl 2003, pp. 126-128. 49 This department was in charge of the section "Volkswirtschaftliche Bilanzen" (national accounts) of the German statistical yearbooks (StJR).
50 BA R 3102 2700 BA R 3102 , 19. 4. 1938 . 51 Erbe and an earlier estimate by Ritschl present significantly higher amounts (see Table VIII We do not know as to what extent these additional funds of the government were used for work creation, rearmament or public investment. 52 It is remarkable, however, that between 1933 and 1935 the entire work creation program (aggregated 4.8 billion RM) as put forward in Table 3 was matched by deficit spending of the government (aggregated 7.5 billion RM). Government borrowing even contributed to financing the rearmament program by a substantial part. Above all, funds for increased government debt came from private savings held by banks and insurance companies as financial intermediaries. Not before 1934 did business firms come to the forefront as a source of government borrowing through providing short term funds, probably by accepting Mefo-bills. 53 Foreign creditors profited from increased repayment of debt. Partly their claims were merely reduced by devaluation of their currencies, however. Without the devaluations of the Anglo-Saxon countries and of the goldbloc in 1936 the debt of the German government would have had increased even more on balance.
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For 1936 we got the reliable figure on GDP of 83 billion RM (Fremdling/Staeglin 2014 a, b): the 4.4 billion RM of public borrowing of that year made up more than five percent of GDP. Of course one can doubt whether this figure and comparable ones for the years before qualify to be labelled as "pronounced (ausgeprägtes) deficit spending" as Ritschl (2003, p. 133) put it. The fact of a deficit financed recovery-program as such is undeniable. The argument 52 Financing public investment is the primary concern of Ritschl 1992. 53 Mefo-bills were specific bills of exchange for financing military outlays, see Ritschl 1992, pp. 166 ** including devaluation of foreign debt and "der Gewinne aus dem Skriptverfahren" *** partly share issue ("davon Aktieemission") -"Kurswerte der gegen Bareinzahlung ausgegebenen Aktien aus Gründungen und Kapitalerhöhungen (ohne Banken und Versicherungen, deren Kapitalaufnahme in den übrigen Krediten schon gezählt ist)."
should be based on the impact of these programs rather than on some kind of scholastic discussion on its nature: to be or not to be Keynesian. This impact is primarily an empirical question: and we tackled this issue as such -made possible by the now available input-output table of 1936.
VIII The impact of military spending on production and employment 1932-1939
Spoerer and Streb rightly claim that the economic leaders of the NS-regime did not at all want to stimulate consumption by their work creation programs, they rather intended to channel the mobilized resources into increased armament. Work creation was thus accompanied by a highly restrictive wage and income policy and by campaigns to save earned money.
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These aims and measures of the German government of course went contrary to any type of Keynesian inspired economic policy and raises some doubts on our methodology to analyse this policy: the increasing preponderance of rearmament reveals the limitations of our model. This is based on fixed structural interdependencies of the German economy in 1936, clearly reflected in the Leontief matrix and its fixed input-output coefficients. According to our sectoral breakdown (see Table 4 ) agriculture would have profited overwhelmingly from the 2.5 billion RM the government spent on work creation in 1934: directly and indirectly induced production by 7.3 (D2) or 9.3 (D1) percent and directly and indirectly induced employment by 26 (D2) or 32 (D1) percent of the macroeconomic effects. Compared with agricultural employment and gross production in 1936 this would have made up 3.4 (D2) or 5.1 (D1) percent. Given the priorities of the regime and the performance of agriculture such an increase of production and employment in agriculture itself is not conceivable. Degler/Streb (2008) clearly show that the agrarian sector under the NS-regime performed poorly in comparison with productivity gains before (Weimar period) or after the War in West Germany. Except for some increase of output agricultural performance did not match the selfimposed goals of the regime, it was rather a "lost battle for production (verlorene Erzeugungsschlacht)". 56 On the other hand, prices of agricultural products were kept down by the state´s price control. James concluded: "… cheap food after 1934/5 helped to sustain the growth of the 1930s." 57 In any case our approach 58 reveals that tight controls of the government were necessary to channel resources into those branches of the German economy which met the increasing demand for rearmament and thus fulfilled the aims of the regime.
For our published analysis of the impact of rearmament expenditure on production and employment in 1936 we used an aggregate version of the input-output table (Fremdling/Staeglin 2014 b) . Here, we complement our previous results for 1936 and in addition, we extend the analysis to most of the other years of the 1930s by explicitly using the comprehensive version of our input-output table detailed for 40 branches or sectors. Furthermore, we apply the Leontief model combined with the Keynesian multiplier. Table 8 presents our basic data on government expenditure in total and on military spending, in particular for the year 1936.
As explained in section III, the basic data of the input-output table had to be rearranged for applying the input-output analysis: to isolate the effects of rearmament, the government sector was split up into civilian (non-military) and military spending. Military expenditure thus became a separate vector of final demand. We applied our model by using the same matrix algebra and the same consumption function as for the work creation programs (see section V). Besides the adapted input-output table, we replaced the final demand by vectors of military spending. Table 9 shows the estimated impact of rearmament on the German economy in 1936.
Our calculation yielded the large direct and indirect impact (Leontief linkages) on the production of those industries closely associated (directly and indirectly) with arms production: vehicles and aerospace, basic iron and steel products, fabricated iron and steel products, chemical-technical industry and metal products and to lesser degree machinery. In these industries a fifth to a third of their labour force worked directly and indirectly for military purposes. Building and construction was the largest single sector profiting from rearmament (see Table 9 ). Constructional steel, machinery and vehicles are the sectors which directly produced armament (e. g. air planes, war ships, tanks, cannons etc.). In these industries the indirect Leontief linkages are much weaker than those on the iron and steel industry and non-ferrous metal production, which delivered the intermediate inputs for the specific armament industries and their suppliers. Construction or the building industry built barracks for soldiers and constructed new and extended naval ports, airports for the Luftwaffe (air force), bunkers and fortifications. 59 The picture changes if employment and Keynesian multiplier effects are taken into account as well. Here "agriculture" comes to the forefront. The high share in induced employment was of course due to the low labour productivity (thus a high labour output ratio) of German agriculture. Furthermore the same pattern emerges as described in section V for work creation programs. The multipliers induced by military spending (see last row of Table 9 ) are higher than those for work creation. This is due to the fact that direct military spending involved nearly all branches of our input-output table.
In 1936 between four and five million work places directly and indirectly depended on the military budget, thus between 13 and 16 percent of total labour force in that year. Direct and indirect Leontief effects alone revealed that more than 12 percent of the industrial workers and in total, seven percent of the labour force in Germany were directly or indirectly engaged in armament production. As early as 1936, when the major impact of rearmament was still to come Germany´s preparation for the war brought about these effects on employment. 
IX Evaluation -impact on employment
Putting together the effects of both work creation proper and rearmament (see Table 11 ) demonstrates that more than one million jobs were created here as early as 1933. They formed a substantial part of the German labour force. And in 1934 and 1935, even three to four million people were employed in this manner. Several hundred thousand and later millions of jobs profited from the additional income spent on consumption. In the years from 1936 onwards, the enormous increase to five million and more for armament production alone was accompanied by additional employment and measures to restrict additional consumption. Although we did not discuss other means of public investment, the steep rise of public spending, regardless of the questionable purposes, suggests a larger impact on employment than recent historical research maintained. 61 The more so if we ignored the agricultural sector with its oversized work force and the notoriously extremely low productivity and if we considered the industrial part of the German economy separately, instead.
Of course one can speculate about a counterfactual scenario as has been put forward by Ritschl: "An upswing … would have had exactly the same vigor without Hitler and without deficit spending." It is true that the turning point of the business cycle had been passed in 1932, thus before Hitler had become chancellor and maybe it is also true that work creation programs and rearmament were not a necessary condition to achieve full employment as early as 1936/37. On basis of our reassessment, however, we can safely claim that they were a sufficient condition for this purpose.
The substantial increase of people employed through work creation programs and subsequently bound for rearmament surely helped the German economy in driving towards full employment: whereas in 1933 on a yearly average 4.8 million people were registered as unemployed with peaks in January and February of about six million (see StJR 41/42, p. 426) this figure dropped to 1.6 million unemployed (StJR 41/42, p.426) in 1936 and to negligible proportions thereafter.
In more general terms, our reassessment rather supports the former view put forward, e. g. by Overy that the NS-regime introduced "a wide range of government policies designed to 61 For a summary of the discussion, see Spree (2004) , Spoerer (2005) and Spoerer/Streb (2013, pp. 114 Tables 3, 10 augment and speed up the existing recovery" (Overy 1982, p. 65 
